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NOTE AND COMMENT
quired amount to the county.' It would seem then that there
is no good reason why subrogation should not be permitted in
this State.
Leonard H. Langen.
MULTIPLE TAXATION: THE SUPREME COURT
LETS DOWN THE BARS
The decade which has just come to an end has witnessed
one of the most remarkable cycles in the constitutional law of
taxation in the history of the United States Supreme Court.
When the Court convened for its October Term, 1929, multiple
taxation, in the sense of taxation of the same economic interest
by more than one State, was not per se unconstitutional. But,
with the decision in Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota,'
January 6, 1930, the Court squarely held to the contrary and
thereupon took up the battle against multiple taxation with all
of the zeal of a crusader. When, in 1932, the Court decided
First National Bank of Boston v. Maine,' victory appeared com-
plete. But, alas, man is mortal and judicial personnel changes.
In a series of cases culminating in Curry v. McCanless,' decided
in May, 1939, the Court repudiated the doctrine that due process
of law necessarily precludes taxation by two or more States and,
while not expressly overruling the earlier cases, in effect left
them little more than lifeless monuments to the past.
The traditional point of departure has been the maxim,
mobilia sequuntur personam, it being a principle of general ap-
plication in the Conflict of Laws that,'for purposes of determin-
ing jurisdiction over property, movables follow the person, i. e.,
the domicil of the owner. But, at least in the case of tangible
property, the maxim states such an obvious fiction that, since
the decision in Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,'
decided in 1905, it has been settled that, once a chattel has ac-
quired a more or less permanent physical situs elsewhere,' the
"Sec. 2207, R. C. M., 1935.
1280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. 371 (1930).
'284 U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 174, 76 L. Ed. 313 (1932).
'307 U. S. 357, 59 S. Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 1339 (1939).
4199 U. S. 194, 26 S. Ct. 36, 50 L. Ed. 150 (1905).
OThe situs need not be permanent. It is probably sufficient that the
chattel is being held or used for some local purpose on tax day. Grom-
er v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U. S. 362, 32 S. Ct. 499, 56 L. Ed.
801 (1912); Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 S. Ct. 475, 29 L. Ed. 715
(1885). Cf., upholding a poll tax on transient laborers, Haavik v.
Alaska Packers' Association, 263 U. S. 510, 44 S. Ct. 177, 68 L. Ed. 414
(1923). But it is not enough that the chattel, such as a railway car,
is frequently within the State, if its employment is interstate. John-
son Oil Co. v. Okla., 290 U. S. 158, 54 S. Ct. 152, 78 L. Ed. 238 (1933).
The proper procedure is to strike an average of the cars customarily
within the State. American Refrig. Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70,
19 S. Ct. 599, 43 L. Ed. 899 (1898). Where, however, no foreign situs
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domiciliary State can no longer tax it. The same principle was
applied to inheritance taxes in Frick v. Pennsylvania,' notwith-
standing continued application of the rule that the law of the
domicil governs succession, it being said that the maxim must
yield to actual situs. It is to be noted, however, that these cases,
while resulting in single taxation, did not rest upon any assump-
tion that multiple taxation is per se unconstitutional.
But taxation of intangibles is a different story. Since they,
by hypothesis, have no physical existence, not only does the max-
im mobilia sequuntur personam state a fiction as to them, but
any attempt to assign them a taxable situs must be equally arti-
ficial and fictitious. The choice is between two fictions, if a
choice is to be made, and must rest upon considerations of eco-
nomic and fiscal policy.
The earlier cases generally refused to make a choice. Al-
though it is true that in State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds,' de-
cided in 1873, Pennsylvania was denied power to tax interest
payable by a Pennsylvania corporation to non-resident owners
of its bonds, the principle involved was later obscured by diverse
interpretations,' and in the famous case of Blackstone v. Miller'
it was held that New York might impose an inheritance tax upon
an indebtedness owed by a New York resident to an Illinois de-
cedent. The reasoning of the latter case, based upon power of
the debtor's State over his person and so over compulsion of
payment, was equally applicable to property taxes. On the oth-
er hand, in Blodgett v. Silberman," the State of the decedent's
domicil was allowed to impose an inheritance tax. Furthermore,
it had been decided that jurisdiction to tax might follow from
mere presence of documents embodying the chose.' And there
was even a disquieting fourth threat of taxation arising from a
line of cases upholding property taxes at the so-called "business
situs" where moneys were employed in business or were being
recurrently invested and reinvested.'
appears to have been acquired, the domicil of the owner may tax the
chattel even though it is never within the State. Southern Pacific Co.
v. Kentucky, 222 U. S. 63, 32 S. Ct. 13, 56 L. Ed. 96 (1911).
6268 U. S. 473, 45 S. Ct. 603, 69 L. Ed. 1058 (1925). Cf. City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U. S. 112, 55 S. Ct. 29, 79 L. Ed.
228 (1934).
'82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 300, 21 L. Ed. 179 (1873).
$In Blackstone v. Miller the case was said to depend upon the foreign
location of the bonds as specialties, whereas in Blodgett v. Silberman
it was said to rest upon the impairment of contract clause. Neither
seems correct.
'188 U. S. 189, 23 S. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 439 (1903).
1'277 U. S. 1, 48 S. Ct. 410, 72 L. Ed. 749 (1928).
'Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, 34 S. Ct. 607, 58 L. Ed. 1030 (1913).
Cf. Buck v. Beach, 206 U. S. 392, 27 S. Ct. 712, 51 U. Ed. 1106 (1906).
"New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 20 S. Ct. 110, 44 L. Ed. 174
(1899) ; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 20 S. Ct. 585, 44
L. Ed. 701 (1899) ; Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 221
U. S. 346, 31 S. Ct. 550, 55 L. Ed. 762 (1910).
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But, in a series of cases decided at its October Term, 1929,
the Supreme Court executed a complete about-face, expressly
overruled Blackstone v. Miller, impliedly overruled Wheeler v.
Sohmer, " and eagerly embraced its Latin maxim which attrib-
utes, as the Court applied it, exclusive jurisdiction to the State
of the domicil of the creditor-owner of the chose. In Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota" it was held that Minnesota could
not levy an inheritance tax upon succession to bonds of Minne-
sota municipalities owned by a New York decedent and physi-
cally kept in New York. Baldwin v. Missouri' made it plain
that physical location of documents is not decisive. Each case,
however, carefully left open the possibility of taxation at the
"business situs."
Corporate stock has received a similarly varied treatment.
Corry v. Baltimore," decided in 1905, upheld a property tax by
the State of incorporation notwithstanding foreign domicil of
the stockholder; but in Hawley v. Malden," in 1914, the owner's
domicil was permitted a like tax. Then, after the 1930 outlawir
of multiple taxation, came First National Bank of Boston v.
Main," wherein the Court, faithful to its mission, denied Maine
the power to tax the inheritance of stock of a Maine corporation
owned by a Massachusetts decedent. Again, mobilia sequuntur
personam.
The income tax cases have scarcely felt the pressure of the
campaign against multiple taxation. Shaffer v. Carter" allowed
taxation by the State of the source of the income; Maguire v.
Trefry" permitted taxation at the domicil. In Senior v. Braden,"
decided in 1935, the latfer case was questioned, the Court evi-
dently feeling the logical necessity of invalidating double in-
come taxation, but it soon became settled, in People ex rel. Cohn
v. Graves," that the Court would continue to uphold both taxes.
The doctrine of "business situs," permitting taxation apart
from domicil, has proved useful in dealing with corporations,
such as those of Delaware, whose domicil is technically in one
State but economically and practically in another. Thus, in
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox,' decided in 1936, it was held that
"supra, note 11.
"Supra, note 1. See also, Beidler v. S. Car. Tax Comm., 282 U. S. 1,
51 S. Ct. 54, 75 L. Ed. 131 (1930).
u281 U. S. 586, 50 S. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1056 (1930).
16196 U. S. 466, 25 S. Ct. 297, 49 L. Ed. 556 (1905).
"232 U. S. 1, 34 S. Ct. 201, 58 L. Ed. 477 (1914). Cf. Frick v. Pa.,
supra, note 6.
13Supra, note 2. Subsequent developments were foreshadowed by Mr.
Justice Stone's dissent, arguing for taxation by State of incorporation.
"252 U. S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221, 64 U. Ed. 445 (1920).
"253 U. S. 12, 40 S. Ct. 417, 64 L. Ed. 739 (1919).
2295 U. S. 422, 55 S. Ct. 800, 79 L. Ed. 1520 (1935).
"300 U. S. 308, 57 S. Ct. 466, 81 L. Ed. 668 (1937). Of. Lawrence v.
State Tax Comm., 286 U. S. 276, 52 S. Ct. 556, 76 L. Ed. 1102 (1931).
"298 U. S. 193, 56 S. Ct. 773, 80 L. Ed. 1143 (1936).
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West Virginia, where a Delaware corporation had its principal
place of business, kept its books, etc., might tax the accounts re-
ceivable, bank accounts, etc., "existing" or arising from business
done in other States. It was implied that Delaware could not
tax. In a case decided the following year, First Bank Stock
Corp. v. Minnesota," the same principle upheld a tax by Minne-
sota, where the management functioned, upon foreign bank stock
owned by a Delaware holding company, engaged in chain bank-
ing in Minnesota, Montana and the Dakotas.'
The first direct approval of double taxation (apart from the
income tax cases) came with the decision in 1938 of Schuylkill
Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania," permitting taxation of corporate
stock, owned by a non-resident, by the State of incorporation.
Said the Court, "The property right so represented is of value,
arises where the corporation has its home, and is therefore with-
in the taxing jurisdiction of that State; and this, notwithstand-
ing the ownership of the stock may also be a taxable subject in
another State." First National Bank of Boston v. Maine' was
not overruled but can be distinguished only on the ground, gen-
erally repudiated, that different considerations govern property
taxation and inheritance taxation.
It is with respect to taxation of trust property, or inheri-
tance thereof, however, that there has been most emphatic rejec-
tion of the tenet that multiple taxation per se violates the due
process clause. Cases decided prior to 1930 had taken the po-
sition that, at least insofar as concerns property taxes, jurisdic-
tion rests with the State in which the trust is administered, the
theory being quite analogous to that of "business situs." Ordin-
arily, as in the leading case of Safe Deposit Trust Co. v. Vir-
ginia,' such State has coincided with location of the property or
documentary evidence thereof and also with domicil of the
trustee. In that case it was held that the foreign State of the
beneficiary's domicil could not tax his interest in the trust. But
only last May the Supreme Court, reviving the discredited case
of Bullen v. Wisconsin" as authority, held in Curry v. McCan-
"301 U. S. 234, 57 S. Ct. 677, 81 L. Ed. 1061 (1937).
'*On the question whether taxation at such "commercial domicil" pre-
cludes taxation by the technical domicil, see Newark Fire Ins. Co. v.
State Board of Tax Appeals, 307 U. S. 313, 59 S. Ct. 918, 83 L. Ed.
1312 (1938), where four Justices argued for the negative but four
were noncommittal.
"302 U. S. 506, 58 S. Ct. 295, 82 L. Ed. 392 (1938).
"Supra, note 2.
"280 U. S. 83, 50 S. Ct. 59, 74 L. Ed. 180 (1929). There are decisions,
involving testamentary trusts being administered by trustees appointed
by Courts, denying power to tax to the jurisdiction of the trustee's
domicil, the trust being administered in a different State. Newcomb
v. Page, 244 Mass. 516, 113 N. E. 458 (1916). C . Putnam v. Middle-
borough, 209 Mass. 456, 95 N. E. 749 (1911).
'240 U. S. 625, 36 S. Ct. 473, 60 L. Ed. 830 (1916). But in Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567, 47 S. Ct. 202, 71 L. Ed. 413
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less' that, where a Tennessee decedent had established but re-
served powers of revocation and alteration by deed or will over
an Alabama trust and had exercised the power by bequeathing
the property to the same trustee but on different trusts, both
States had the power to impose inheritance taxes upon the en-
tire trust property. Control over the property by the settlor,
said the Court, was a potential source of wealth which justified
taxation by the State of her domicil. Likewise, administration
and legal ownership by the trustee justified taxation by Ala-
bama. In other words, jurisdiction no longer depends upon an
artificial concept of situs, exclusive or otherwise, but upon prac-
tical considerations tending to show identity of economic inter-
ests with, and resulting substantial interests of, the various
States concerned. But why, asked Chief Justice Hughes, in his
dissenting opinion in the companion case of Graves v. Elliott,
should power to revoke have justified domiciliary taxation here,
whereas in Frick v. Pennsylvania power to remove chattels from
the State of their situs to the domiciliary State did not justify
such a tax? But the case of Pearson v. McGraw,' decided at
the current term, dispels any doubt that the Court will adhere
to the position taken.
Today, as was true even when multiple taxation was pro-
hibited, there is the additional danger of conflicting findings of
domieil. The now classic illustration is the Dorrance" litigation,
wherein both New Jersey and Pennsylvania found that the de-
cedent was domiciled in their respective States, both collected
taxes upon the entire estate, and the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari in both cases. Some hope of relief was
afforded by the decision in Texas v. Florida where the Su-
preme Court took original jurisdiction to determine the conflict-
ing claims of domicil, but the hope was cut short by the holding
(1926), the domiciliary State was denied the power to tax succession
to a foreign trust as to which the decedent had and exercised a power
of appointment by will.
"Supra, note 3.
3305 U. S. 667, 59 S. Ct. 151, 83 L. Ed. 432 (1939). Cf. 25 IowA L. Rzv.
165 (1939).
2307 U. S ..... , 60 S. Ct. 211, 84 L. Ed. 139 (1939).
"Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932), cert. den, 287 U. S.
660, 53 S. Ct. 222, 77 L. Ed. 570 (1932) and 288 U. S. 617, 53 S. CL
507, 77 L. Ed. 990 (1932) ; Dorrance v. Thayer-Martin, 115 N. J. Eq.
268, 170 N. E. 601 (1934), aff'd 116 N. J. L. 362, 184 Atl. 743 (1936),
cert. den. 298 U. S. 678, 56 S. Ct. 949, 80 L. Ed. 1399 (1936) ; Hill v.
Martin, 296 U. S. 393, 56 S. Ct. 278, 80 L. Ed. 293 (1935). For a his-
tory of this litigation, see Ohlander, Double Inheritatnce Taxation, 14
TAX MAO. 387, 390, 448 (1936). And see Tweed and Sargent, Death
and Tazea Are Certain-But What of Domicil 53 H~Av. L. REv. 68
(1939).
*4306 U. S. 398, 59 S. Ct. 563, 83 L. Ed. 817 (1939). Cf. 52 HARV. L.
RZv. 1178 (1939).
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at the current term, in Massachusetts v. Missouri,' that juris-
diction will be taken only when it appears that the estate is in-
sufficient to satisfy all conflicting tax claims.
It is well to note that the prohibition of multiple taxation
has never been extended to the case of international conflicts.
Consequently, although there are due process clauses in both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it is held that the Federal
Estate Tax may reach foreign bonds kept here but owned by a
citizen of Great Britain domiciled in Cuba at his death" and also
that the Federal Income Tax may reach income of a United
States citizen domiciled in Mexico even though the income is ex-
clusively from Mexican land."
Largey MacDonald.
TAXABILITY OF PROPERTY OF MUTUAL
IRRIGATION COMPANY
The method of taxing the irrigation system of a mutual
irrigation corporation was worked out by an interesting appli-
cation of the principle allowing disregard of the corporate en-
tity in Brady Irrigation Company v. Teton County, et al.,' de-
cided by the Montana Supreme Court in 1938. Plaintiffs,
stockholders in the irrigation company, sought to restrain the
commissioners and treasurer of Teton County from securing
a tax deed to lands, reservoir, dams, ditches, canals, and other
like property of the irrigation company. The Court held that
the injunction should be granted, saying that the total value
of the property owned by the irrigation company represents
the aggregate value of the water rights of its shareholders; that
these rights when used by the shareholders become appurtenant
to their lands, adding to the taxable value of those lands; and
that in a case of a mutual irrigation company the Court would
look behind the corporate veil and avoid taxing these interests
twice.
That water rights are appurtenant to the land on which
they are used is well-settled. Being appurtenant, such rights
"307 U. S ...... 60 S. Ct. 39, 84 L. Ed. 38 (1939). Cf. 26 VA. L. REV. 2.81
(1939).
"Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, 53 S. Ct. 457, 77 L. Ed. 844 (1935).
"Cook v. Tait, 265 IT. S. 47, 44 S. Ct. 444, 68 L. Ed. 895 (1923).
'107 Mont. 330, 85 P. (2d) 350 (1938).
'Tucker v. Jones, 8 Mont. 225, 19 Pac. 571 (1888) ; Hale v. Jefferson
Co., 39 Mont. 137, 101 Pac. 973 (1919) ; Osness Livestock Co. v. War-
ren, 103 Mont. 284, 62 P. (2d) 215 (1936); Pendola v. Ramm, 138
.Cal. 517, 71 Pac. 624 (1903) ; Whittlesley v. Porter, 82' Conn. 95, 72
Atl. 593 (1909). And see WIEr, WATER RIGHTS IN WESTERN STATES
(3d ed., 1911), Sec. 551. This rule is aided in Montana by Sec. 6671,
R. C. M., 1935: "A thing is deemed to be incidental or appurtenant to
land when it is by right used with the land for its benefit."
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